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Alex Wellington has provided an invaluable survey of 
feminist arguments for and against vegetarianism. My 
utilitarian defense of vegetarianism was intended to 
preclude neither rights-based nor feminist justifications. 
Its goal, rather, was to show that the least controversial 
ground for vegetarianism--{)ne that extends moral 
concern to nonhumans on the basis of their ability to 
suffer and feel pleasure-is sufficient to respond to two 
well-known defenses of meat eating. 
Whereas most of the feminist philosophers whom 
Wellington discusses reach similar conclusions to those 
ofmy utilitarian argument, or else disagree because they 
reject traditional utilitarian or rights-based frameworks, 
one of them-Kathryn Paxton George-raises an 
objection that is directly relevant to my utilitarian case. 
George argues that certain biological facts about women 
and ecological and economic realities about the poor 
and people who live in some developing countries 
would make the demand that they become vegetarians 
unfairly burdensome. IfGeorge has her empirical data 
right, then, as Wellington correctly observes, utilitarian 
advocates ofvegetarianism may have to carve out wide 
exceptions to the demand that we all become 
vegetarians. Women who lack the resources to 
DISCUSSION 
compensate for the nutritional deficit that would 
allegedly result from giving up meat and people, 
especially those in developing countries, who cannot 
fmd affordable nonmeat sources of protein would be 
excused if vegetarianism would cause them more 
suffering than is currently inflicted on the nonhuman 
animals that they eat. 
However, contrary to Wellington's claim that such 
limitations on the argument for vegetarianism would 
be "somewhat arbitrary," they are perfectly compatible 
with a utilitarian approach. The most famous utilitarian 
vegetarian ofall, Peter Singer, concedes thathis argument 
may not apply to Eskimos, whose only available source 
of protein is meat. 1 A consistent utilitarian must take 
into account all relevant consequences, and, while it 
may make the morality of meat eating more complex, 
it is not at all arbitrary to recognize crucial differences 
between men and women and between industrialized 
and developing countries. The fact that utilitarianism 
avoids blanket moral judgments that ignore vital 
distinctions between different cases is one of its great 
advantages as a moral theory. 
Asimilar response applies to George's concern that 
the utilitarian argument for vegetarianism would brand 
women and inhabitants of developing countries as a 
"moral underclass" of people who are unable to fulfill 
the duty to be vegetarian. The key point is that 
utilitarianism would impose no such duty in the first 
place on any people for whom vegetarianism would be 
unduly burdensome, in that their sacrifices in refraining 
from eating meat would be greater than the harm 
currently caused by their meat eating. Hence neither 
women, poor people, nor inhabitants of developing 
countries would be condemned to being unable to fulfIll 
their moral duties, and the charge that the utilitarian 
argument for vegetarianism serves only "the most 
privileged class of humans" is unfounded. 
So, even ifGeorge's empirical claims are supported 
by the evidence, they do not undermine the utilitarian 
case for vegetarianism. A utilitarian can consistently 
relativize the duty to refrain from eating meat to those 
on whom it would not impose an unfair burden. 
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